The questions below are the ones the committee identified but deliberately did not answer, because GA 2.0 is a set of reforms rather than a single defined model. The community must determine which reforms to adopt and how they should be combined. This section also addresses how reforms interact when combined, because reforms that make sense individually may produce unintended interactions when implemented together.
REFORM PACKAGE DESIGN
Which Reforms to Adopt as a Package. GA 2.0 is a set of reforms, not a blueprint. The committee identified the options but did not specify which combination constitutes a recommended configuration. That choice requires community deliberation and depends on which problems the community most wants to address.
Sequencing of Structural vs. Procedural Reforms. The committee discussed whether procedural reforms should be implemented first, given that they require no charter amendment and can be adopted more quickly, with structural reforms addressed through a subsequent charter amendment process. This sequencing question was not resolved.
Reform Interaction Effects. Several reforms interact in ways that affect how they should be designed together:
- Create an Administrative Executive Committee (SR-2) and Raise the Contract Threshold (SR-4) together determine the practical scope of between-meeting administrative authority. Their thresholds must be calibrated against each other; a high contract threshold with a low AEC threshold creates redundancy, while the reverse leaves a gap in administrative coverage.
- Raise and Redefine Quorum (SR-1) and Introduce Differentiated Voting Thresholds (SR-7) together determine the baseline and elevated voting requirements. The supermajority required under SR-7 is only meaningful relative to the quorum level defined under SR-1.
- Establish Remote Participation Rights (SR-6) and Introduce a Secret Ballot Option (SR-10) together create a design dependency: secret ballot procedures for remote participants require separate technical design that neither reform specifies independently.
- Formalize an Annual Town Meeting (SR-9) and Establish a Standing Finance and Budget Committee (SR-3) together constitute the annual review cycle. Both reforms are needed for the full annual portfolio review concept to function as a system.
- Adopt Parliamentary Rules by Ordinance (PR-1) is a functional prerequisite for most other procedural reforms. Without an adopted parliamentary authority, enforcement mechanisms for Comment Limits (PR-2), Packet Acknowledgment (PR-3), the Waiting Period (PR-6), and the Conflict of Interest Procedure (PR-8) lack procedural grounding.
That analysis remains to be done before any specific configuration is selected.
AEC DESIGN
AEC Design Specifics. Size (3 vs. 5 members), selection method (elected vs. appointed), term length, compensation, and the financial threshold framework defining AEC authority were all identified as requiring further design work if SR-2 is adopted. The AEC is the most structurally significant reform in the inventory and also the most incompletely designed.
AEC Relationship to the Mayor Role. If an AEC is created, whether the Mayor chairs the AEC, serves as one of its members, or operates separately from it affects both the AEC's authority and the Mayor's continuing role. This was not resolved.
CHARTER AND THRESHOLD QUESTIONS
Quorum Replacement Threshold. The committee identified the current 7-member quorum as warranting reconsideration but did not specify a replacement number or formula. Options include a fixed higher number, a percentage of registered GA members, or a tiered threshold varying by decision type.
Contract Threshold Replacement Amount. The range of $25,000 to $50,000 was discussed but not settled. The appropriate amount should be calibrated against Ophir's actual budget and typical contract patterns before being written into charter language.
SR-8 Petitioning Procedure. The continuance mechanism depends on a workable petitioning procedure that does not yet exist. The 10% threshold was discussed but the timing and logistics of gathering signatures between the introduction of a matter and a vote were identified by the town attorney as a practical obstacle. Alternative approaches might include pre-registered standing objections, a defined cooling-off period triggered by a specified number of members present rather than a petition, or a petition window that opens after a first reading rather than at the point of vote. None of these alternatives were developed.
SR-9 Classification: Structural vs. Procedural. The town attorney's recommendation that the Annual Town Meeting be kept informal rather than mandated by charter raises the question of whether SR-9 belongs in the structural reforms category. If the annual anchor meeting is implemented by GA resolution rather than charter amendment, it becomes a procedural reform rather than a structural one, with meaningfully different stability. A resolution can be modified by a future GA vote, while a charter provision requires a community ballot. The committee did not resolve whether the resilience of a charter mandate outweighs the legal concerns identified by the attorney, or whether a resolution-based approach adequately achieves the goal of creating a durable annual accountability cycle.
GOVERNANCE PROCESS DESIGN
Parliamentary Procedure Authority. The committee examined modified consensus with majority fallback, Robert's Rules of Order, the AIP Standard Code, Rosenberg's Rules, and other approaches, but did not reach a conclusion regarding which parliamentary framework would be most appropriate for Ophir.
Annual Portfolio Review Design Details. The committee developed the annual portfolio review concept but did not determine what information should be collected, how committee findings should be presented, or how annual results should be documented and carried forward from year to year.
MAYORAL ROLE QUESTIONS
Mayor and Mayor Pro Tem Job Description Expansion. The current charter's description of the Mayor's role is brief (Article II, Section 8a). Expanding it to define administrative responsibilities and the working relationship with the Town Manager was raised as a discrete reform but not developed.